in the experience of lawyers as it was in 1912 when Wharton cooked it up. 6 To reassure myself the subject doesn't "smell of the lamp," 7 before undertaking this Essay I tapped "impossibility" into Westlaw, which designated nearly 1500 criminal cases as on point, 900 or so more recent than 1999. From that I take it that impossible attempts are not, as some courts and commentators have insinuated, merely a professorial hobby horse. 8 Instead, impossible attempts express a non-trivial tension between risk-taking and harm-causing within the very real world of criminal litigation.
Impossibility also merits continued study because it seemingly began to erode as a defense to a charge of attempt as soon as 15 years after its 1864 discovery. 9 Now it is hornbook that impossible attempts are punishable as crimes. 10 Specifically,
[t]hirty-seven states have explicitly eliminated impossibility as a defense to a charge of attempt and the federal circuits that have not done likewise have so limited the range of application of the defense as to render it virtually a dead letter. As a result, one's 6 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 225, n.8 (James M. Kerr ed., 11th ed. 1912). susceptibility to punishment for attempting the impossible is today a rather uncontroversial matter of settled law.
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Beyond the rhetoric that impossibility is no longer a defense, 12 that it still has a place in the law of attempt was evident in the digests and law reviews long before Graham Hughes touted it 50 years ago as an area that repays close study. 13 Agreement that the impossibility defense has a way of rehabilitating itself from criticism continues. What continues more precisely is a sense of a non-trivial difference between failing at larceny by picking the empty pocket of a passerby on a sidewalk and by picking the empty pocket of a mannequin in a department store. What remains up in the air is what accounts for that difference. Despite two absolutist positions on this -1) impossibility is a defense to a charge of attempt; and 2) no it is not a defense -we have a lingering sense that some cases should come out one way and some another. But because we have evolved no language to account for the difference, we live in a state of uneasiness about it.
Here I rehearse an argument meant to help decode the impossibility 
III. The Concept of Mistake and Its Limits
Mistakes involve the idea of a wrong alternative -taking one thing for another or taking one tack rather than another.
You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, fire: the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim, and find to my horror that it is your donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and say -what? 'I say, old sport, I'm awfully sorry. I've shot your donkey by accident?' Or 'by mistake?' Alternatively, I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on it, fire -but as I do so, the beasts move, and to my horror yours falls. Again the scene on the doorstep -what do I say, 'by mistake' or 'by accident'?
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With accidents, something befalls ("I didn't mean to shoot a donkey -any donkey" -or "that was not the donkey I was aiming at"). With mistakes, you take the wrong one when you have both the competence and commitment to take the right one ("I meant to shoot that donkey, but thought it was mine, not yours"). This last qualification is most important and most frequently overlooked in published decisions.
Neither Cheek nor Flippo made a mistake, even though both took one thing for another. If getting things right is unlikely, guesswork, or random, then getting them wrong is not by mistake. Only if you have knowledge in the first place can your knowledge fail and count as a mistake as opposed to a wrong belief owing to something -carelessness, recklessness, fantasy, delusion -other than mistake. When you make a mistake, you mean to do exactly what you do, at least to a point. It is just that you misinterpret your situation: you take someone else's property for yours, a minor for an adult, silence for consent, a harmless prank for a deadly threat.
[S]uppose the order is 'Right turn' and I turn left: no doubt the sergeant will insinuate that my attention was distracted, or that I cannot distinguish my right from my left -but it was not and I can, this was a simple, pure mistake. As often happens. Neither I nor the sergeant will suggest that there was any accident, or any inadvertence either.
Again, if you tell me "fetch my umbrella," and on seeing several in the designated area I grab an umbrella clueless as to which is yours, I am not mistaken if it turns out to be someone else's.
Two criteria for the correct deployment of our concept of mistake seem essential. First, for me to fetch the wrong umbrella by mistake, I would need a basis for knowing which one is yours. If I am merely guessing, then mistake drops out as a description of what goes wrong. Thus it would be eccentric for me to say "I made a mistake" after guessing the wrong lottery numbers. When success is only random, mistake is never the explanation of the unhappy outcome.
Second, I must have a commitment to getting things right. Even if I have reason to know which umbrella is yours, if I grab just any old umbrella, then you might have been mistaken to rely on me to fetch it for you by taking me for considerate and careful. But my lack of commitment to take the right one precludes my explaining that I have taken the wrong umbrella by mistake. I cannot fail at something at which I have not even tried.
Still, we must not be too finicky in establishing the criteria of mistakes, lest nothing would qualify and the word would cease to have any specific application in the world. An example of a too finicky notion of mistake is deployed by the sophist Thrasymachus, who challenges Socrates:
[D]o you call a man who makes mistakes about the sick a doctor because of the very mistake he is making? Or a man who makes mistakes in calculation a skilled calculator, at the moment he is making a mistake, in the very sense of his mistake? I suppose rather that this is just our manner of speaking -the doctor made a mistake, the calculator made a mistake, and the grammarian. But I suppose that each of these men, insofar as he is what we address him as, never makes mistakes. Hence, in precise speech, . . . none of the craftsmen makes mistakes. The man who makes mistakes makes them on account of a failure in knowledge and is in that respect no craftsman. So no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes mistakes at the moment when he is ruling, although everyone would say that the doctor made a mistake and the ruler made a mistake.
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To Thrasymachus, know-how fails whenever a mistake is made. When knowhow fails, he goes on, then the activity to which the know-how pertains ceases to occur. The craftsman (doctor, calculator, grammarian, ruler) no longer "is what we address him as" when he makes a mistake because if he really is a craftsman, then his knowledge will never fail. Because on that account knowledge is infallible, if you make a mistake you cannot have been acting "on the basis of your knowledge."
On that account, someone who is not trained in medicine cannot make a medical mistake (thus the hilarity of the Sprite soft drink commercial that asks whether you would want a pro basketball player operating on you). Someone who is trained in medicine, contrariwise, cannot not make a mistake because medicine is not occurring at the moment of the lapse, since failures of knowledge are false to the activity itself ("you call yourself a doctor?"). his would-be rape or murder victim is already dead? 71 Or his would-be murder victim is alive but sleeping in another room when the "murderer" shoots through a window, striking a pillow, which is taken for the victim? 72 And what about someone who intends to take a deer out of season, but the deer turns out to be a stuffed decoy? 73 The answer to each question posed above is embedded first in an answer to a prior question: is defendant trying to commit what really is a crime? 74 If it is, then his failure -which manifests nothing redeeming about him -is something for which he deserves only partial credit: bad intention, lucky result. If he meant to shoot or rape a dead person (not a live one), shoot a pillow (not an enemy), or take a stuffed deer (not a real one) out of season, then he is not attempting anything. 75 He is shooting or violating a corpse, shooting a pillow, or taking a stuffed deer, actions whose criminality, if any, has nothing to do with rape, murder, or preservation of deer from overzealous hunters.
Even if defendant owns up to having tried to commit what really is a crime, there must -because of the limits of what it means to fail due to a mistake -be some instances where he should get off scot-free. Those limits explain how the term "impossibility" insinuated itself into the law of attempt: blame has no place when the prohibited harm never had a chance to occur. As such, an impossible plan (if plan there be) lacks the proximity to success that justifies a conviction of attempt. Success is impossible when these would-be thieves, rapists, murderers, and scofflaw hunters go about things in such an unlikely way as to make their failure the inevitable upshot of delusion or fantasy, not mistake. 76 They give us doubt about whether they intended to commit a crime or take the requisite "substantial" 77 or "direct but ineffectual" 78 step toward its completion. Though they well may need some sort of reprogramming or warehousing, because they are too disconnected from reality to have "made a mistake," they are not to be dealt with in the same way we deal with fully responsible agents who barely fall short of the harms they threaten. 79 For example, what are the conditions under which someone could think a decoy deer is a real deer? A convincing decoy deer in the woods staged there by the game warden should lead to the conviction of someone who shoots at it of attempting to take a deer out of season:
The State's evidence shows that conservation agents, about two weeks before the alleged offense, had procured the hide of a 2½ year old doe which had been killed by an automobile in Pulaski County. They had taken it to a taxidermist, who soaked it to soften it, stuffed it with excelsior and boards, inserted rods in the legs so it would stand upright and used the doe's skull in the head part of the hide so it would hold its former shape. For eyes, which had not been preserved, two small circular pieces of scotchlight reflector tape of a 'white to amber color', had been placed over the eyeless sockets.
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The Missouri statute which conservation agents sought to enforce criminalized unauthorized pursuit, taking, killing, possession, or disposing of all wildlife, not just deer. 81 In fact, defendants were in search of a wolf they saw run across a road they took en route to a frog-hunting expedition. 82 Thus they attempted to take a wolf out of season by shooting at a decoy deer that they took -on these facts justifiably -for a wolf. But move the decoy deer to the end of a grocerystore aisle or any other place where deer are unlikely to appear, or lower the quality of the decoy so that it looks fake from any distance, and a conviction of attempt becomes manifestly absurd. J.L. Austin once put to students in a seminar at Harvard: "if a man hacks away with an axe at a pile of logs under the bedclothes, thinking it to be a man in his bed, isn't this attempted murder, despite the fact that the courts hold that it is not?" 86 Austin's question was rhetorical. After all, elsewhere he criticized a judge whose instructions to the jury made the defendant, by comparison, stand out as an "evident master of the Queen's English." As for the judge, he probably manages to convey his meaning somehow or other. Judges seem to acquire a knack of conveying meaning, and even carrying conviction, through the use of a pithy Anglo-Saxon which sometimes has literally no meaning at all. Wishing to distinguish the case of shooting at a post in the belief that it was an enemy, as not an 'attempt,' from the case of picking an empty pocket in the belief that money was in it, which is an 'attempt', the judge explains that in shooting at the post 'the man is never on the thing at all.' 87 Austin is right: the expression may be meaningless at the literal level, but the judge does manage to get his point across somehow. What would make the man take a post for an enemy, anyway? Without good grounds for taking the one for the other, the man "is never on the thing at all," the "thing" being the successful shooting of an enemy, a risk so remote that the man is never "on" it. His means (shooting at a post) are so poorly selected for the desired ends (shooting a man) that success is too unlikely from the get-go to treat the project as a serious attempt. There is something wrong with him, not with what he saw; he is not mistaken (missing a bit of information), but delusional (at odds with reality).
Before we could consider this shooting an attempted murder, we would need to know more about the incident, more than the stick-figure sketch that Austin -a lover of facts -gave us. 88 Only then could we be in a position to say that the man had a basis for taking the post for an enemy; only then could we be in a position to say that in shooting at the post "by mistake" did he attempt to kill a man.
Another way of saying this is that we can imagine situations in which shooting a post would be an attempt, just as we can imagine situations in which shooting a stuffed deer (in, say, the grocery store) would not be an "attempt to take a deer." For example, shooting a bare post sticking in the ground from three feet is not an attempt to commit murder, though it may conceivably be an attempt to commit murder to shoot a very realistic scarecrow from 50 yards. The whole thing seems fishy, too fantastic to count as a mistake. As "sordid and revolting a picture" of human action as it is, 98 Thomas does not bespeak an attempt, not without more than the scant factual development that the court provides.
Violating a corpse is a perversion quite apart from anything like real rape.
In fact, someone who violates a corpse very likely does so because the person is dead ("and I will kill thee, and love thee after"). 99 Such an action should provoke negative reaction sure enough, but not the same as to someone who has put himself to commit rape and failed due to, say, resistance on the would-be Either just before or just after she expired from being choked, beaten, and smashed in the face with a brick, a four-inch twig was inserted in her rectum. 102 To conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder charges was consequently added sexual assault, Doyle's conviction of which was reversed for lack of proof as to whether penetration with the foreign object occurred before death. 103 Although Nevada is among those states that condition rape on a live victim, 104 the state high court noted in dictum that felony murder may be predicated on attempted rape, which may lie when a would-be rapist justifiably takes a barely dead victim for alive. Code cites "black magic" (aka voodoo) as a means that indicates nondangerousness, 107 at once acknowledging that "it is by no means clear that those who make unreasonable mistakes will not be potentially dangerous." 108 Indeed, anyone out of touch enough to take just any old pillow for a person may in fact be dangerous. 109 Dangerous or not, no progress can be made by declaring, as many do, the "black magic" scenario a mistake. 110 Black magic has nonetheless become a "stock example" of the staying power of the impossibility defense, despite the universally held official position that impossibility is no longer a defense to a charge of attempt. 111 As a clear and high example of a stillborn attempt, these cases of "incantations" 112 are deployed by courts and commentators to demonstrate "some validity to decisions that distinguish the tree stump from the empty pocket case." 113 Accordingly, purchased for this eventuality into his coffee," only to realize "that she mistakenly added sugar to his coffee, just as she does every morning." 125 As an act of repentance, Clarissa then turns herself in, apparently as attempted murderer. 126 maybe Parsons had a stocky constitution, but her efforts were far from doomed ex ante, quite apart from whether Parsons had it coming to him. In this respect does Clarissa's actual litigation get us much closer than the "classic" hypothetical version to discovery or agreement about both the basis of her mistake (if mistake there be) and what to do about it.
V. Conclusion
Nothing is more central to the understanding of untoward human action than the operation of mistakes. And nothing is more conventional than the notion that mistakes may be unreasonable, even "extreme. 
